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Abstract
This paper examines the incentives of a firm to invest in information about the
quality of its product and to disclose its findings. If the firm conceals information, it
might be detected and fined. We show that optimal monitoring is determined by a
trade-off. Overall, stricter enforcement reduces the incentives for selective reporting
but crowds out information search. Our model implies that there are situations in
which the relationship between the two monitoring instruments might be comple-
mentary. We also show that the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure depend on
how it is enforced and that imperfect enforcement (in which some information re-
mains concealed) might be optimal. In particular, the optimal fine might be smaller
than the largest possible fine, even though the latter requires lower resource costs
for inspections.
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1 Introduction
The US FDA Amendment Act 2007 requires that results must be posted
on clinicaltrials.gov within a year of the completion of the trial for all trials
with at least one site in the US. The FDA has the power to fine trial sponsors
who do not comply but rarely does this . . . The proposed EU Clinical Trials
Regulation will require that summary results for every registered trial must
be posted within one year of the completion of the trial, and the European
Commission is discussing how to enforce this properly. Trial approval bodies
in each country should consider expanding their monitoring of reporting, and
ensure there is routine and open public audit of compliance for each individual
trial.
- The AllTrials Campaign1
In September 2004, the pharmaceutical company Merck voluntarily withdrew Vioxx–
a pain medication for arthritis–from the world market, because a clinical trial indicated
that it increased the risk of heart attacks and strokes when taken for at least 18 months.
Later, however, it was discovered that the company had failed to warn of the drug’s
dangers before the withdrawal. Following several scandals of so-called selective reporting
of clinical trial results, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA)
included the requirement of basic result reporting. Mandatory disclosure rules have also
been established in other areas. For instance, manufacturers of SUVs are required to
report rollover risk in the US. This regulation followed an inquiry into a series of deadly
accidents during which it was found that the tire manufacturer Bridgestone/Firestone and
the auto company Ford had failed to inform the public about the risk of Ford Explorer
SUVs rolling over after tires blew out without warning.2
The above quote argues that mandatory disclosure rules for clinical trials should be
complemented by strict enforcement. Considering monitoring through penalties and ap-
propriate resources to conduct inspections, our research question is to identify the effects
of such an enforcement.3 Our results uncover a trade-off that optimal enforcement must
balance and that policy discussions seem to be unaware of.
1The AllTrials campaign was launched in 2013 and at the time of writing has been signed by 93403
people and 740 organisations, see www.alltrials.net, accessed on 08/06/2018.
2On Vioxx see Berenson (2006), Antman et al. (2007) or Krumholz et al. (2007). On the FDAAA of
September 2007 see Wood (2009). A detailed account of the SUV rollover scandal and the development of
the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD) of November
2000 can be found in Fung et al. (2007). This book also discusses 17 other policy areas in which mandatory
disclosure rules exist, including corporate financial disclosure, nutritional labeling and restaurant hygiene
disclosure. Dranove and Jin (2010) offer further background on disclosure including a brief history.
3Fung et al. (2007) discuss (on p. 45-46) in detail the need for appropriate enforcement through
monitoring and levying penalties. The FDAAA allows for civil penalties of as much as $10 000 per day
but this is considered to be insufficient, see Prayle et al. (2012), Anderson et al. (2015) or Gopal (2015).
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We consider an information transmission game with hard evidence between a firm
and the public (Milgrom, 1981; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Seidmann
and Winter, 1997). Hence it is not possible to fabricate the entire evidence of a clinical
trial. The firm’s product is either effective or has side-effects. A clinical trial potentially
reveals these consequences to the firm. We allow for the possibility that the firm is not
informed, so that the classical unravelling argument is mitigated (Dye, 1985; Shin, 1994).
Consequently, a clinical trial can either be positive, negative or inconclusive (De Angelis
et al., 2004). As with Shin’s sanitization strategy, negative trials are suppressed and
positive ones revealed, so that selective reporting is obtained in equilibrium.
The firm is required to disclose quality and safety problems. A monitoring agency
invests resources in inspections and imposes a fine on the firm when it discovers that
the firm conceals information. Enforcement is hence captured by a combination of a
probability of detection and a fine.4 Inspired by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) that controls production plants and searches for contamination problems of which
the seller might or might not be aware, the agency detects with some probability the
existence of quality and safety problems. If this is the case, it also learns if information
was concealed. An extension considers the case in which the agency does not search for
information on the state of the world but detects selective reporting directly.
Selective reporting is considered to be harmful to society.5 It might therefore appear
that we can gain insights into optimal enforcement by drawing an analogy to law enforce-
ment. Following Becker (1968) the deterrence of a harmful act depends on the expected
fine. Moreover, it is optimal to combine a low probability of detection with the highest
possible fine, for, if the fine were not as high as possible, then one could simultaneously
increase the fine and decrease the probability of detection, thereby reducing enforcement
costs. In this paper, however, we show that optimal enforcement in our context and in
law enforcement differ in important ways. In particular, the largest possible fine might
not be optimal, even though it requires fewer resources for inspections.
One difference between the two settings is that the firm’s profits from concealing
information depend on the monitoring policy. This is so, because the firm’s profits depend
on the beliefs of the public about the quality of its product. When no hard evidence is
As a result, there are calls for greater transparency in clinical trials, including Goldacre (2013), Chan et
al. (2014), Hudson and Collins (2015), and the aforementioned AllTrials on-line petition.
4The agency can also be thought of as a surrogate for indirect enforcement like litigation, whistle-
blowing, political activism or journalistic investigations. Under this interpretation, different institutional
designs of liability trials, confidentiality agreements, and legal protection for whistle-blowers might be
related to different magnitudes of the probability of detection.
5For the case of clinical trials De Angelis et al. (2004, p. 477) write “The case against selective
reporting is particularly compelling for research that tests interventions that could enter mainstream
clinical practice. . . . When research sponsors or investigators conceal the presence of selected trials, these
studies cannot influence the thinking of patients, clinicians, other researchers, and experts who write
practice guidelines or decide on insurance-coverage policy.”
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revealed these beliefs depend on the interplay of two effects. On one hand, the failure of
the firm to disclose positive information makes the public more pessimistic, as it is aware
that information might be withheld. We refer to this as the scepticism effect of a lack of
evidence.6 On the other hand, if monitoring does not find concealed information, then
the public becomes more optimistic; and the higher the probability of detection, the more
optimistic the public becomes. We call this the confidence effect of monitoring.
Another difference between the two settings is that the firm has two alternatives to
concealing evidence. The intended effect is to induce the firm to reveal its evidence
honestly. But monitoring can also have the unintended effect of stopping the firm to
acquire information in the first place. We denominate the latter as the disincentive effect
of monitoring on information search and show that it might deter both honestly and
selectively reported information. The incentive to invest in the former declines, as the
confidence effect raises the opportunity costs of information. The incentive to invest in
the latter declines, because stricter enforcement increases the expected fine.
It is well known that when enforcement is exogenous, a change from voluntary to
mandatory disclosure reduces the incentives to invest in information.7 It is also well
known that the strenght of this disincentive effect depends on the shape of the firm’s
profit function.8 In our model the precise condition for the disincentive effect not to
crowd out investment in information completely is a generalization of convexity of the
profit function that allows for both convex and concave segments. We assume that the
firm’s profit function is a general function of the public’s beliefs but provide a micro-
foundation for a convex relationship when treatment effects are more likely to be moderate
than strong.9
Our first contribution is to deepen our understanding of the disincentive effect. Opti-
mal monitoring is determined by a trade-off. Stricter enforcement reduces the incentives
for selective reporting but crowds out information search. We add to the literature that
this trade-off between the quality and the quantity of information is overall robust to
endogenizing enforcement but that it depends on the monitoring instruments in subtle
6When the firm is known to be informed, this effect leads to the classical unravelling result.
7See Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), Farell (1986), Shavell (1994), Dahm et al. (2009), Henry
(2009), Polinsky and Shavell (2012), Kartik et al. (2017) and Schweizer (2017).
8As Kartik et al. (2017, p. 27) observe, “the martingale property of Bayesian updating implies that
experts would gain nothing by acquiring information” when payoffs depend linearly on these beliefs.
9There is also suggestive evidence that such a relationship is not unrealistic. Grabowski et al. (2002)
estimated a highly skewed distribution of returns (net present values) for new drug introductions. More
precisely, the top decile of most successful new drugs accounted for a 52% of the total present value
generated by all new drugs. This seems to suggest that the market rewards higher quality at a highly
increasing rate. Moreover, it seems that this pattern has not changed over time. Grabowski and Vernon
(1994) found a highly skewed distribution of returns for the 1980–1990 period. In this study, the top two
deciles accounted for more than a 70% of the total net present value.
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ways.10 First, the disincentive effect arises from the mere existence of enforcement, even
when monitoring is not stringent enough to avoid selective reporting. Second, when mon-
itoring is stringent enough to avoid selective reporting, there are two opposing effects of
raising the detection probability. On one hand, the confidence effect raises the opportu-
nity costs of investment in information. But on the other hand, this effect applies less
often, as the public is more frequently informed. We provide a condition on the shape
of profit function which we call strictly increasing average quality, so that the function is
responsive enough to the confidence effect and investment incentives decline.
Third, the nature of the relationship between the monitoring instruments might be
different from the law enforcement setting. As explained before, in that model, increasing
the probability of detection and maintaining an individual indifferent between committing
or not the harmful act requires decreasing the fine. The monitoring instruments are
substitutes in producing deterrence. This is because there is a deterrence effect of law
enforcement, as a higher probability of detection deters the harmful act. In our model,
this deterrence effect is mitigated by the confidence effect. The confidence effect makes
withholding of evidence more attractive, because it raises the firm’s payoffs when it is not
detected. Again we provide a condition on the shape of the profit function (measured
by an elasticity) under which the function is responsive enough to the confidence effect,
so that increasing the probability of detection and maintaining an individual indifferent
between committing or not the harmful act requires to increase the fine. The monitoring
instruments are complements in producing deterrence.11
Our second contribution is to investigate how the trade-off in monitoring should be
resolved. The examples we have explored suggest that enforcement of disclosure rules is
often welfare improving.12 We present, however, an example with the following implica-
tions. First, it is important how mandatory disclosure rules are enforced. Some successful
policies (that perfectly enforce mandatory disclosure) might generate lower welfare than
laissez-faire, while other successful policies might induce higher welfare. Second, imper-
fect enforcement (in which some information remains concealed) might be better than
both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. This is because the same monitoring policy
must apply to different markets and stricter enforcement triggers a strong disincentive
effect on investment in information in one of these markets. In that market investing in
information and reporting it selectively is preferable to no investment in information at
all. This conclusion does not rely on monitoring costs. Even if some additional resources
10Kartik et al. (2015) provide a related comparative statics result when the agent who sends a message
bears a disclosure cost. Kartik et al. show that this leads to less disclosure. Their setting is different,
however, as the agent is exogenously endowed with information.
11We also show that the condition on the elasticity is stronger than strictly increasing average quality.
12The fact that monitoring might reduce the amount of information available does not imply that
stricter monitoring is undesirable. It is well known that the firm might have an incentive to invest in
information when this is inefficient (see Jovanovic, 1982; Milgrom, 2008).
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for inspections are costless, it might not be beneficial to raise the probability of detection.
Similarly, the optimal fine might be smaller than the largest possible fine, even though it
requires fewer resources for inspections.
Related Literature
The law enforcement literature does not suggest that maximum penalties are always
optimal (Garoupa, 1997; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). Among the different reasons which
may advocate for non-maximal penalties are marginal deterrence incentives (Mookherjee
and Png, 1992), socially costly sanctions (Kaplow, 1990), differences in wealth among
individuals (Polinsky and Shavell, 1991), imperfect information on the probability of
apprehension (Bebchuk and Kaplow, 1992), risk-aversion (Polinsky and Shavell, 1979) or
the possibility to engage in socially costly activities reducing the probability of detection
(Malik, 1990). Lenient fines can also arise when penalties for collusion are dynamic and
dynamic conditions for cartel stability are considered (Harrington, 2014). Since none of
these papers contains a model of information transmission, these rationales for limits on
fines are qualitatively different from the rationale we present.
Corts (2014), however, offers a rationale for finite expected penalties when false ad-
vertising claims signal unverifiable information about product quality. Optimal expected
penalties might be finite, because when information on quality is expensive, society prefers
the firm not to eliminate all uncertainty. Instead, it is desirable that the firm makes ‘spec-
ulative claims’ that sometimes turn out to be false. Too severe penalties deter the firm
from making these claims. In contrast, we offer a model of selective reporting of verifiable
information, rather than of false claims.13 The drawback to high penalties is that they
deter investment in information, rather than that they deter a firm to make claims that
are likely, but not certain, to be true. Moreover, we explicitly model monitoring policies as
a probability of detection in combination with a fine, rather than as an expected penalty.
This allows us to derive the novel result that the fine and the probability of detection can
be complements, which shows that the forces in our model are conceptionally different
from those in all these previously reviewed papers.14
The literature on disclosure rules does not suggest that mandatory disclosure rules are
13Piccolo et al. (2015) and Rhodes and Wilson (2017) offer related models of unverifiable information
in which false advertising claims might deceive consumers about quality. In both models the optimal
policy might not deter false advertising, because false advertising facilitates lower prices.
14In Dye (2017) the seller of an asset is liable to damages if it is detected that an estimate of the asset’s
value was withheld. Dye derives the related result that raising the probability that a fact finder detects
selective reporting might induce the seller to disclose his estimate less often. The forces in Dye’s model,
however, are different from those in our model. In Dye’s model a similar result applies to the damage
multiplier (which is akin to the fine in our context), while raising the fine always induces less selective
reporting in our model. Less closely related, Andreoni (1991) and Feess and Wohlschlegel (2009) find in
a different model that deterrence might decrease in response to an increase in punishment.
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always better than voluntary ones. Polinsky and Shavell (2012) show that, because of the
disincentive effect on endogenous information, welfare under the latter might be higher.15
We go beyond this result and show that the welfare effects of mandatory disclosure depend
on how it is enforced. We also show that imperfect enforcement in which some information
remains concealed might be optimal. The optimal effective disclosure rule might thus fall
between the benchmarks of mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
It is also known that different disclosure rules have different effects on reporting and
information search. Dahm et al. (2009) show that voluntary and compulsory clinical trial
registries, which make the firm’s decision to search for information observable, cannot solve
the problem of selective reporting. They also show that a voluntary results database,
which is a specific voluntary disclosure rule, leads to unravelling, because it allows an
uninformed firm to prove that it has no information. The present paper differs from that
paper by focussing on a mandatory disclosure rule that is successful when appropriately
enforced, rather than a voluntary disclosure rule that is followed in order to avoid sceptical
inference from the public.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model. Section
3 characterizes its equilibria and establishes the existence of the trade-off in monitoring.
Section 4 investigates the welfare effects of enforcement. Section 5 discusses robustness
of our findings to alternative monitoring technologies. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Agents
Consider a firm (or seller) that sells a good to buyers (or the public). The quality of the
good depends on the state of the world v ∈ {0, 1} and is ex-ante unknown. The prior
probability that the good generates benefits (v = 1) is q ∈ (0, 1); with probability 1 − q
the good has side-effects (v = 0). To be concise, we refer to q as measuring the (expected)
quality of the good, rather than as the ex-ante likelihood of benefits or risk of harm.
15Relatedly, Di Tillio et al. (2015) show in a different model that it might be beneficial to allow for
manipulation of information, because it might lead to more information in the system. Related forces
appear in the sequential search model of Henry and Ottaviani (2017). Their earlier working paper allows
for manipulation of information and shows that allowing some misreporting through a limited penalty
is beneficial. In Kartik et al. (2017) mandatory disclosure rules would harm the decision maker. This
implication of their model comes from the fact that adding more experts reduces each expert’s incentive
to invest in costly information. The reason for this is related to our result that successful monitoring
affects the opportunity costs of information search, although the details differ. Dranove and Jin (2010)
review additional reasons why mandatory disclosure does not always raise social welfare.
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2.2 Information search by the seller
Prior to offering the good for sale, the seller can invest in a test to provide information
about product quality. Mimicking the outcomes of clinical trials, there are three possible
outcomes (De Angeles et al., 2004). A positive test demonstrates that the seller’s product
is of high quality (v = 1), a negative one shows that the seller’s product is of low quality
(v = 0), and an inconclusive one does not provide new evidence.
Formally, the result of the test is denoted by t. With probability x ∈ [0, 1] the true
state of the world is revealed and t = v. With probability 1 − x, the test is inconclusive
and t = ∅. The test has a constant marginal cost Kx > 0. The information revealed
is hard evidence. This captures that a pharmaceutical firm cannot fabricate the entire
evidence of clinical trials and indicate that treatment effects exist when they do not. The
firm might, however, report results selectively. Denoting the seller’s report or message by
m, if t = v, the seller can publish or conceal the result of the test, i.e. m ∈ {v, ∅}. If t = ∅,
the seller has to report m = ∅. We assume that the public cannot distinguish between a
seller who invests in information and hides the result and a seller who does not invest in
information; in both situations the public receives the message m = ∅.16
2.3 The seller’s payoffs
A central element of our model is the seller’s profit function pi(q), which represents the
equilibrium profits from the sales process.17 For most of our paper we consider a general
function pi(q), rather than a specific interaction that gives rise to a specific functional
form. This is so, because our equilibrium analysis depends only on the shape of pi(q). The
following conditions define a class of functions that permits a sharp characterization.18
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity) The profit function pi(q) is weakly increasing in the
quality q of the product, with pi(0) < pi(q) < pi(1) for all q ∈ (0, 1) and pi(0) = 0.
Loosely speaking, Assumption 1 requires strict monotonicity at the endpoints of the inter-
val and allows for weak monotonicity for intermediate values. This is in line with evidence
16This assumption is motivated by our leading example of pharmaceutical clinical trials. In an editorial
Drazen et al. (2007) discuss legislation strengthening the FDA’s regulatory authority and write (p. 1756)
“The trial’s sponsor, claiming proprietary rights, could keep all information about it, including its very
existence, private. Thus, if a drug had important adverse effects, this information might never be made
public.” Notice also that the quote in footnote 5 describes a similar scope for manipulation.
17For our purpose it is sufficient to assume that this function depends directly on the (possibly updated)
belief of the public about the quality of the good. This avoids additional notation capturing that the
public takes actions based on q, say to buy or not to buy the firm’s product, which in turn affects the
profit function of the firm. Kartik et al. (2015) and (2017) make a similar assumption.
18Corts (2014) makes a similar assumption to our Assumption 1 in a different model. For analytical
convenience we often assume implicitly that pi(q) is differentiable.
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from the antiulcer-drug market (Azoulay, 2002). Without such a monotonicity the seller
has no incentive to search for information and to conceal negative information, preclud-
ing to study the problem of selective reporting. For simplicity of the exposition we also
normalise pi(0) = 0. While we impose Assumption 1 throughout, the following properties
impose more structure on the shape of pi(q) and will become important for some of our
results.
Assumption 2 (Average quality) Let pi(q) be the profit function of the firm.
1. Average quality is bounded if for all q ∈ (0, 1) we have that
pi(q) < qpi(1). (1)
2. Average quality is strictly increasing if for each ζ ∈ (0, 1) and all q we have that
ζpi(q) > pi(ζq). (2)
Assumption 2.2 is related to the notions of concave and convex functions. The difference
is that concavity and convexity are based on the monotonicity of the marginal slope,
while it requires monotonicity of the average slope. The inequality in (2) is equivalent
to the requirement that the slope of the chord from the origin, given by pi(q)/q, must be
strictly increasing. This is weaker than strict convexity of pi(q), because pi(q) can have
both convex and concave segments. Assumption 2.1 weakens Assumption 2.2, as it only
requires that pi(q)/q is bounded by pi(1).19 To see that Assumptions 1 and 2 are not
unreasonable, it is instructive to consider the following examples.
Example 1 Suppose the firm sells to a single consumer. When the consumer buys the
firm’s product, profits pˆi and consumer surplus CS are generated. With probability 1−q the
good is harmful (v = 0) and causes side-effects H, in addition to CS. Given a (possibly
updated) belief q, the consumer buys the good if and only if she is sufficiently trustful that
side-effects do not appear, that is,





This implies that pi(q) = pˆi if q ≥ q
i
and pi(q) = 0 otherwise. This function fulfils neither
Assumption 1 nor the two properties of Assumption 2.
19Assumption 2.2 also implies Assumption 1 and is related to the notion of a strictly star-shaped
function with respect to the origin (Bullen, 1998), which has appeared in the economic literature (see e.g.
Landsberger and Meilijon, 1990; Chateauneuf et al., 2004; Armantier and Treich, 2009). We will see that
Assumption 2.1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the firm to be willing to invest in information
when all test results must be reported.
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Example 2 Consider Example 1 but with a continuum of consumers with mass 1. With
many pharmaceutical products there is uncertainty about the balance of benefits and harms.
To focus on the former, let all consumers have the same level of potential side-effects
H = 1 but assume that they benefit to different degrees from treatment. Let CS = z
be distributed on the segment [0, 1] according to the distribution function G(z). By (3),
only consumers with large treatment effects buy the drug. For a given q, the fraction of
consumers that buys is 1−G(1−q) and profits are given by pi(q) = pˆi [1−G(1− q)]. When
G(z) has a strictly positive density function, Assumption 1 holds. When G(z) is concave
(convex), pi(q) is convex (concave) and the two properties of Assumption 2 hold (do not
hold). Concavity captures the realistic feature that moderate treatment effects (measured
here by CS) are more likely to appear than strong effects (the median is smaller than
1/2).
2.4 Enforcement of mandatory disclosure
An agency monitors the firm. We think of monitoring as being similar to a situation
in which the FDA controls a production plant searching for contamination problems of
which the seller might be aware or not. If such problems are found, the agency tries to
establish whether the firm was aware of them. Thus, monitoring might reveal information
both on the firm’s reporting behaviour and on the state of the world.20
Formally, when the seller does not reveal the state of the world (that is, m = ∅),
the agency conducts a test at a constant marginal cost Kρ > 0. This test detects with
probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) that the product is of low quality.21 The agency only searches for
negative information. This is motivated by our interest in selective reporting and the fact
that the seller has no incentive to hide positive information. Denoting the outcome of the
agency’s report by r ∈ {0, ∅}, we have that
Pr (r = 0|v = 0) = ρ = 1− Pr (r = ∅|v = 0) and
Pr (r = 0|v = 1) = 0 = 1− Pr (r = ∅|v = 1) .
The agency might also learn about the firm’s reporting behaviour. The agency discov-
ers whether there was selective reporting when the test is successful but learns nothing
when the test fails. Formally, when r = 0 the firm’s test result t is also revealed. The
agency can hence compare t to m.22 If the agency finds that r = 0, it makes this public.
If, in addition, the agency finds evidence of selective reporting, a fine F > 0 is imposed.
20In Section 5 we discuss the alternative assumption that the agency acquires information on reporting
behaviour directly and does not learn about the state of the world.
21When m 6= ∅, the agency’s test is redundant, as the firm’s message is hard evidence. Assuming that
the agency conducts tests with probability β smaller than one would not change our results. It would
suffice to make a change of variable so that ρ′ = βρ and rescale Kρ.
22This best-case scenario for monitoring is the conservative assumption to make. The agency could
learn the test result only with some probability but this case is less interesting. The reason is that our
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2.5 Timing
Once a monitoring policy (F, ρ) is in place, the sequence of events is as follows:
1. The firm decides whether to conduct a test (the public does not observe this choice).
2. The seller sends a message m to the buyer which is observed by the agency (if no
test has been conducted, m = ∅).
3. If m = ∅, the agency conducts its own research and obtains a report r, which is
then made public (otherwise, r = ∅). If r = 0 the agency also learns the firm’s test
result t (if no test has been conducted, t = ∅ is revealed).
4. Depending on the outcomes of m and r as well as t (provided t was revealed), the
agency decides whether to impose the fine on the firm, and the public updates her
beliefs about the expected quality of the seller’s product (that is, that the state of
the world is v = 1) from the prior q to a posterior belief q˜.
5. The sales process captured through Assumption 1 takes place. The seller pays the
fine, if the firm was monitored and a fine was imposed.
This game is solved by backward induction. Given that the public does not observe
the investment decision in a test, she has to base her behaviour on her beliefs about the
seller’s choice. Moreover, the sales process when the state of the world has been revealed
is a proper subgame of the extensive form game. The appropriate equilibrium concept is,
hence, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which all agents behave optimally, given
their beliefs about the other’s action and these beliefs are, at equilibrium, correct.
3 The monitoring trade-off
We investigate now the equilibria of the game, given an arbitrary monitoring policy (F, ρ).
As usual in this type of models, an informative and a non-informative equilibrium might
coexist, depending on how expensive tests are. We investigate these possibilities in Sub-
sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Subsection 3.3 builds on the equilibrium analysis and
shows that monitoring policies must balance a trade-off.
3.1 The informative equilibrium
In an informative equilibrium the public expects the firm to invest in information and
the beliefs of the public must be consistent with the firm’s reporting behaviour. We start
main result that optimal monitoring might not be as strict as technically feasible is the less surprising,
the less powerful the monitoring technology of the agency.
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with the latter and turn then to the firm’s investment decision in information. Lastly, we
summarize the informative equilibrium.
3.1.1 The firm’s reporting behaviour
Suppose the firm invests in information. Denote the probability that the seller reports
the test result honestly after a negative test by y. A general formulation of the firm’s
reporting behaviour that allows for mixing between reporting and concealing evidence
after a negative test is defined as follows
m(y) =

1 if t = 1
∅ if t = ∅
0 with probability y if t = 0
∅ with probability 1− y if t = 0
. (4)
Notice that (4) includes selective reporting mSR and honest reporting mHR of test results
for y = 0 and y = 1, respectively.
The posterior beliefs of the public are then given by
q˜ =

Pr (v = 1|m = 0) = 0 if m = 0
Pr (v = 1|m = ∅ ∧ r = 0) = 0 if m = ∅ ∧ r = 0
Pr (v = 1|m = 1) = 1 if m = 1
Pr (v = 1|m = ∅ ∧ r = ∅) = q˜∅ if m = ∅ ∧ r = ∅
. (5)
The subindex ∅ in q˜∅ indicates that the public has not received new information, as neither
the firm nor the agency reveal the state of the world. This belief is given by
q˜∅ ≡ Pr (m = ∅|v = 1) Pr (r = ∅|v = 1) Pr (v = 1)
Pr (m = ∅ ∧ r = ∅) =
q(1− x)
1− xq − (1− q) [ρ+ xy(1− ρ)]
and has the following properties. First, the higher the quality of the search technology x,
the more pessimistic the public, as ∂q˜∅/∂x < 0; in the extreme case of x = 1, it is known
that the firm is informed and the classical unravelling argument obtains. Our focus,
however, is on situations in which the test might be inconclusive, so that q˜∅ > 0. Second,
the more pessimistic the prior q, the lower the updated assessment ∂q˜∅/∂q > 0. Third,
∂q˜∅/∂y > 0 holds. The higher the likelihood of selective reporting, the more pessimistic
the public. If the firm is suspected to report selectively with a higher probability (and
so y declines) and no evidence is published, then the public infers that it becomes more
likely that information has been withheld and that the product is of low quality (v = 0).
We call this the scepticism effect of selective reporting. In the extreme cases of selective
reporting (y = 0) and honest reporting (y = 1), respectively, we obtain
q˜SR∅ ≡
q(1− x)




1− ρ (1− q) . (6)
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Lastly, ∂q˜∅/∂ρ > 0 holds. The better the quality of monitoring, the more optimistic the
public becomes. We call this the confidence effect of monitoring. As we will see, this
effect induces some interesting forces to appear in our model.
Suppose the seller invests in information and the test is negative. If the seller reports
m = 0 truthfully, then profits are zero and the firm is not fined. On the other hand,
concealing negative evidence risks being detected by the agency. If detected, it becomes
known that the product is of low quality and in addition the fine F is imposed. If not
detected, the public anticipates the frequency of honest reporting y and profits are pi (q˜∅).
Thus, the firm prefers to reveal rather than conceal a negative test if and only if
(1− ρ) pi (q˜∅) ≤ ρF. (7)
Notice that without appropriate enforcement (7) cannot hold. Under laissez faire, where
ρ = 0, the expected fine is zero. The Monotonicity Assumption 1 implies then that
(7) does not hold. Consequently, the seller only discloses favourable information about
product quality. The comparison in (7) implies the following result.
Lemma 1 For any probability of detection ρ > 0, there exists a minimum penalty
F˜y (q, ρ) ≡ 1− ρ
ρ
pi (q˜∅) (8)
such that for any F ≥ F˜y (q, ρ), the seller discloses all test results.
This lemma shows that there always exist monitoring policies (F, ρ) that can avoid
selective reporting. Because of the Monotonicity Assumption 1, the minimum penalty F˜
is increasing in q˜∅. Thus the properties of the belief q˜∅ in (5) affect the minimum penalty
F˜ and hence the success of monitoring. In particular, we have the following.
First, because of the scepticism effect ∂q˜∅/∂y > 0, the minimum penalty F˜ is increasing
in y. This is so, because the less the firm is expected to conceal information, the higher
the benefit from withholding evidence. A consequence of this property is that both pure
strategy reporting and mixed reporting can appear. To see this notice that in a selective
reporting equilibrium both y = 0 and F ≤ F˜0 (q, ρ) must hold, while the requirements
in a honest reporting equilibrium are that y = 1 and F ≥ F˜1 (q, ρ). The scepticism
effect ∂q˜∅/∂y > 0 implies that F˜0 (q, ρ) < F˜1 (q, ρ), provided the profit function is strictly
monotone (Figure 1 below provides an example). Consequently, for some combinations
of the prior q and monitoring policies (F, ρ) a pure strategy equilibrium at the reporting
stage does not exist. It is neither an equilibrium to report negative information always
honestly, nor is it an equilibrium to report it always selectively. A mixed-strategy, however,
in which the seller sometimes conceals and sometimes reveals negative information allows
to trade-off the frequency of being caught with the benefits from holding back negative
information.23
23Consider a monitoring policy (F, ρ) with F ∈ (F˜0, F˜1) and assume that dpi/dq > 0 holds for the
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3.1.2 The firm’s investment in information
The seller’s expected profits from searching for information are,
Πt(q, y) = xqpi (1) + [(1− x) q + (1− q) (1− ρ) (1− xy)]pi (q˜∅) (9)
− (1− q) ρx(1− y)F − xKx.
The first three terms represent the profits of the firm and depend on what is reported.
With probability xq there will be a positive test which will be revealed and the public
will be certain that the good generates benefits. In the remaining cases, however, the
test will be negative or inconclusive and profits depend on the reporting strategy of the
firm, which are described by y and in equilibrium will be anticipated by the public. For
example, if the firm reports selectively so that y = 0, then only the agency might inform
the public that the product is harmful. In this case the public will be certain that the
good generates side-effects and this happens with probability (1 − q)ρ. In a fraction x
of these events information was withheld and the fine is imposed. In all other cases no
information is revealed and, since y = 0, the public’s belief is q˜SR∅ . On the other hand,
if the firm reports honestly so that y = 1, then the public’s belief is either q˜HR∅ or 0 and
the fine is never imposed. Lastly, mixing between reporting selectively and honestly by
setting y ∈ (0, 1) yields a combination of the profits described for the previous two cases.
The last term represents the costs of the test.
The seller’s expected profits from not searching for information are,
Π¬t(q) = [1− (1− q) ρ] pi (q˜∅) . (10)
Since the seller is expected to invest and to report honestly with some probability y, profits
depend on the interplay between the confidence and scepticism effects via the belief q˜∅.
In addition, there is the risk that monitoring detects low quality.
The seller invests in the test if and only if
Πt(q, y)− Π¬t(q) > 0⇔ Kx < Kt(q, ρ, F, y), (11)
where
Kt(q, ρ, F, y) ≡ q [pi (1)− pi (q˜∅)] (12)
− (1− q) (1− ρ)ypi (q˜∅)− (1− q) ρ(1− y)F.
3.1.3 The informative equilibrium
We summarize the preceding two subsections as follows.
relevant values for q. The seller is indifferent between reporting honestly and concealing negative evidence
if the buyer holds a belief yˆ such that F = F˜yˆ (q, ρ). Notice that, since F˜ is a continuous function of y,
we can apply Bolzano’s Theorem and conclude that such a belief yˆ exists.
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Proposition 1 (Informative equilibrium) With the monitoring policy (F, ρ), there
exists a PBE in which the seller invests in information search, provided the test is cheap
enough, that is, Kx ≤ Kt(q, ρ, F, y), where Kt(q, ρ, F, y) is defined in (12). In this equilib-
rium, the firm’s reporting behaviour is as follows:
(a) If the monitoring technology is weak, that is, F ≤ F˜0 (q, ρ), then the seller reports
selectively.
(b) If the strictness of the monitoring technology is intermediate, that is, F ∈ [F˜0, F˜1],
then the seller mixes between honest and selective reporting.
(c) If the monitoring technology is powerful, that is, F ≥ F˜1 (q, ρ), then the seller reports
honestly.
The reporting behaviour described in part (a) might appear cynical. But it rational-
izes behaviour in line with a statement by Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) at a
hearing: “The pharmaceutical industry has systematically misled physicians and patients
by suppressing information on their drugs...,” see Couzin (2004, p. 1695). In contrast, the
reporting behaviour in part (c) captures the ideal described in De Angelis et al. (2004, p.
477): “The interests of the sponsor or authors notwithstanding, anyone should be able to
learn of any trial’s existence and its important characteristics.”
3.2 The non-informative equilibrium
In a non-informative equilibrium the firm does not invest in information and this is cor-
rectly anticipated by the public. Hence, the scepticism effect is not present. The confi-
dence effect is present, however, since it is known that the agency will monitor the firm.
The beliefs of the buyer are then given by q˜HR∅ in (6). Hence, if the firm does not deviate
and does not invest, expected profits are given by (10) with q˜∅ replaced by q˜HR∅ .
Expected profits from search depend on whether the most profitable deviation involves
selective or honest reporting. For F ≥ F˜1, the most profitable deviation involves honest
reporting y = 1, while selective reporting y = 0 is optimal for F ≤ F˜1. In both cases,
however, since the firm is not expected to search, absent new information, the beliefs of
the buyer are given by q˜HR∅ . Thus, expected profits from search are given by (9), with
y = 1 and q˜∅ = q˜HR∅ when F ≥ F˜1 and y = 0 and q˜∅ = q˜HR∅ otherwise. Using (8) we see
that these expected profits are continuous at F = F˜1.
Thus, the seller invests in the test if and only if
Πt(q)− Π¬t(q) > 0⇔ Kx < K¬t(q, ρ, F, y), (13)
15
where K¬t(q, ρ, F, y) is equal to Kt(q, ρ, F, y) as defined in (12), with y = 1 and q˜∅ = q˜HR∅
when F > F˜1 and y = 0 and q˜∅ = q˜HR∅ otherwise.
24 Again, using (8) we see that the
threshold K¬t(q, ρ, F, y) is continuous at F = F˜1.
From the preceding follows that a non-informative equilibrium requires the test to be
sufficiently expensive. We record this with the following result.
Proposition 2 (Non-informative equilibrium) With the monitoring policy (F, ρ), there
exists a PBE in which the seller does not invest in information search, provided the test is
expensive enough, that is, Kx ≥ K¬t(q, ρ, F, y), where K¬t(q, ρ, F, y) is defined after (13).
3.3 The trade-off between the quality and the quantity of infor-
mation
As explained in the Introduction, it well known that when enforcement is exogenous, a
change from voluntary to mandatory disclosure reduces the incentives to invest in infor-
mation. Our model captures this by setting ρ = 0 and comparing the cost threshold Kt in
(12) for y = 0 (voluntary disclosure) to y = 1 (mandatory disclosure). Since this threshold
is higher for the former than for the latter, there is a trade-off between the quality and
the quantity of information. It is also well known that this disincentive effect has the
potential to be very strong. In our model the precise condition for the disincentive effect
not to crowd out investment in information completely is Assumption 2.1. We suppose
in the remainder of this section that this assumption holds. We show that the trade-off
between the quality and the quantity of information is overall robust to endogenizing
enforcement but that it depends on the monitoring instruments in subtle ways.25
We start with the effect of stricter monitoring on the quality of information. Consider
an increase in the fine. Notice first that if the fine is initially low enough and the increase
is large enough, then comparison of cases (a) and (c) in Proposition 1 implies an increase
in the quality of information. For smaller increases, it is instructive to consider again
the indifference condition between honest and selective reporting in (7). Raising the fine
F and maintaining indifference requires raising pi (q˜∅), and so the probability of honest
reporting y must increase, making the public less sceptical.
Consider now the indifference condition (7) and an increase in the detection probabil-
ity. First, there is the well-known deterrence effect of law enforcement, as the expected
fine increases. But there is also a countervailing second effect. More frequent monitoring
triggers the confidence effect, making the public more optimistic. When the confidence
24Notice that K¬t(q, ρ, F ) ≤ Kt(q, ρ, F ). For any combination of parameter values, there is a PBE.
But it is possible that an informative and a non-informative equilibrium coexist. Our results, however,
do not depend on a particular equilibrium selection.
25We thank a referee for detailed comments that helped us to clarify our contribution to the previous
literature and to simplify considerably the exposition of this subsection.
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effect is very strong, maintaining indifference requires that the firm lowers the probability
of honest reporting y. The overall effect is hence ambiguous and the precise condition for
an increase in the quality of information is the same as in the following Proposition.
This proposition shows that the relationship between the probability of detection ρ
and the fine F does not have to be substitutive but might be complementary. We say
that ρ and F are substitutes if an increase in the probability of punishment lowers the
minimum fine needed to ensure full disclosure (for a fixed level of y), i.e., F˜y(q, ρ) is
decreasing in ρ. We say that ρ and F are complements when the opposite is true and
F˜y(q, ρ) is increasing in ρ. A complementary relationship implies that starting from a
situation in which monitoring provides sufficient incentives to report honestly, an increase
in ρ might lead to insufficient incentives and thus to a decline in the quality of information.
The proposition specifies a condition for a complementary relationship. The discussion
following the proposition provides then an example showing that this condition can be
satisfied under our assumptions. The possibility of a complementary relationship stands
in sharp contrast to the standard law enforcement setting and shows that our setting is
qualitatively different.26









1− xq − (1− q) [ρ+ xy (1− ρ)]
ρ (1− ρ) (1− q) (1− xy) . (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.1. Q.E.D.
This Proposition relates the existence of a complementary relationship to Assumption
2.2. This is so, because on the left hand side of (14) we have the elasticity of the profit
function with respect to q. Strictly increasing average quality is equivalent to this expres-
sion being larger than one for all values of q. Since the right hand side is also strictly
larger than one, condition (14) holds when pi(q) is responsive enough, so that the confi-
dence effect overwhelms the deterrence effect. Consider the profit function pi(q) = q3.27
Figure 1 displays the minimum fine as a function of ρ (Lemma 1) when β = 3 and
x = q = 0.2 for y = 0 (selective reporting) and for y = 1 (honest reporting). It illustrates
a complementary relationship for a large interval of intermediate values of ρ.
Consider now the effect of stricter monitoring on the quantity of information. For
simplicity, the next proposition focusses on either honest or selective reporting.28
26In the standard law enforcement setting the criminal’s payoff from committing a harmful act does
not depend on a belief of the public that he is liable. This prevents the confidence effect from operating,
the right hand side of (8) declines with ρ, and ρ and F are substitutes.
27This function arises from Example 2 when pˆi = 1 and G(z) = 1 − (1 − z)3. The latter is a special
case of the Kumaraswamy distribution, where one parameter is equal to one and the other is three.
28The following result focusses on the informative equilibrium of Proposition 1. A similar result can
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F˜1 (q, ρ)
Figure 1: The minimum fine as a function of ρ when pi(q) = q3 and x = q = 0.2
Proposition 4 Enforcement decreases the incentives to invest in information. More pre-
cisely, for y ∈ {0, 1}:
1. If the monitoring technology is weak, that is, F ≤ F˜0 (q, ρ), then both raising the
fine and the probability of detection strictly decreases the incentives to invest;
2. If the monitoring technology is powerful, that is, F ≥ F˜1 (q, ρ), then raising the fine
does not affect the incentives to invest; these incentives decrease strictly when the
probability of detection is raised if and only if Assumption 2.2 holds.
Proof: See Appendix A.2. Q.E.D.
The first part of this proposition implies that unsuccessful enforcement is not only
costly because it wastes resources on inspections, but also because both monitoring in-
struments reduce the incentives to invest in information. On one hand, selective reporting
risks detection and hence investment incentives decrease with the expected fine. On the
other hand, the confidence effect increases the opportunity costs of investment. The
second part of Proposition 4 implies that it is important how successful enforcement is
enforced. Different combinations of detection probability and fine trigger different disin-
centive effects. If enforcement is successful, then the fine is never imposed and does not
be obtained for the non-informative equilibrium of Proposition 2. For example, under Assumption 2.2
raising the probability of detection, reduces the cost interval [0,Kt(q)] in which search takes place in an
informative equilibrium and increases the interval [K¬t(q),∞) in which search does not take place in a
non-informative equilibrium. Consequently, the incentives for information search are reduced through
stricter monitoring independently of equilibrium selection (if there is multiplicity).
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affect equilibrium behaviour. Raising the probability of detection, however, has subtle
effects. On one hand, it triggers the confidence effect. But on the other hand, this con-
fidence effect applies less often, as the public is more frequently informed. If pi(q) has
strictly increasing average quality, then the shape of pi(q) amplifies the confidence effect
enough to outweigh this second effect and investment incentives decline.
4 Imperfect enforcement can be optimal
Section 3 describes the trade-off in monitoring but does not evaluate how it should be
resolved. We present now an example with the following implications.29 First, because of
the subtleties described in Proposition 4, it is important how mandatory disclosure rules
are enforced. With some successful policies (that perfectly enforce mandatory disclosure),
welfare might be lower than with laissez-faire, while with others it might be higher. Inter-
estingly, the policy generating the highest welfare might not require the lowest resource
costs for inspections. Second, imperfect enforcement (in which some information remains
concealed) might be better than both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. The logic for
this does not rely on monitoring costs. Even if some additional inspections are costless,
it might not be beneficial to raise the probability of detection. Similarly, the optimal
fine might be smaller than the largest possible fine, even though the latter requires fewer
resources for inspections.
Consider a market as described in Example 1 but with two consumers i = A,B. As in
Example 2, the firm receives the same profit pˆi when either consumer buys the product.
Both consumers obtain the same consumer surplus CS but differ in the potential side-
effects Hi. Consumer B’s potential side-effects are more severe, that is, HA < HB. He




.30 Assume that initially
q < q
A
holds, so that based on the prior q consumers do not buy the product. To illustrate
that our assumptions are consistent, we provide the following set of parameter values. Let
HA = 900, HB = 1400, CS = 500, pˆi = 500, q = 0.4, and x = 0.6. This implies that
q
A
= 0.44 and q
B
= 0.64. We also assume that the firm’s test is costless, that is, Kx = 0,
while monitoring has a marginal cost of Kρ = 450.
29Our earlier working paper Dahm et al. (2016) considers a general setting and defines the maximisation
problem of a social planner choosing the optimal monitoring policy. Unfortunately, it turns out that the
planner’s problem is not well behaved and analysis of first-order conditions might not identify the optimal
monitoring policy.
30This implies that pi(q) = 2pˆi if q ≥ q
B
, pi(q) = pˆi if q
B
> q ≥ q
A
and pi(q) = 0 otherwise. This
function fulfils neither Assumption 1 nor the two properties of Assumption 2 and thus shows the role
these assumptions play in our analysis. On one hand, they provide the firm with a strict incentive to
conceal negative information. This applies only to Subsection 4.1 and does not affect the firm’s incentives
to invest in information. On the other hand, in the following example Assumption 2 does not hold and
the disincentive effect of monitoring on information search is very strong.
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The regulator chooses a monitoring policy (F, ρ) to maximize social welfare, defined
as the sum of the firm’s profits and consumer surplus, net of expected side-effects. We
will organise our exploration of policies along two dimensions. First, enforcement can be
unsuccessful or successful in securing honest reporting. Second, enforcement triggers the
confidence effect, making consumers more trustful. Depending on the strength of this
effect, one or both consumers might remain mistrustful and only buy the product when
the test shows that there are no side-effects or become trustful so that they buy unless
side-effects are discovered.
4.1 Unsuccessful enforcement
Consider a policy (F, ρ) such that F < F˜1(q, ρ) and the firm has a strict incentive to
report selectively. Assume that ρ is small enough so that q˜SR∅ < qA holds, implying that
trade requires proof that there are no side-effects.31 This can provide incentives for the
firm to conduct a test, as testing is costless, provided the expected fine is small enough.
The threshold in (12) becomes
Kt = 2qpˆi − (1− q)ρF (15)
and social welfare of unsuccessful enforcement (UE) follows
WUE = 2xq (CS + pˆi)− ρKρ, (16)
because trade requires proof that there are no side-effects. Thus the optimal unsuccessful
enforcement policy is laissez-faire (LF), which sets ρ = 0 and hence F < F˜1(q, 0).
32 For
the above specified set of parameter values, laissez-faire induces a unique informative
selective reporting equilibrium with welfare of WLF = 480, as q˜SR∅ = 0.21 and hence
Kt = 400.
4.2 Perfect enforcement with weak confidence effect
Consider a policy (F, ρ) such that F ≥ F˜1(q, ρ) and the firm has an incentive to report
honestly. Moreover, assume that q˜HR∅ < qA; there is a weak confidence effect (WCE).
As in Subsection 4.1, both consumers do not buy, unless there is proof that there are
31For policies raising the belief to q˜SR∅ ≥ qA there is more trade and thus social welfare is different
from the expression (16) below. These policies, however, are worse than successful policies with the same
detection probability, because some side-effects are avoided when the firm discloses negative test results.
Successful policies are considered next.
32If q˜HR∅ < qA, then Kt = K¬t and a non-informative equilibrium does not exist. For more powerful
policies the threshold K¬t becomes negative and such an equilibrium exists. Such a non-informative
equilibrium, however, is similar to the one arising under a successful policy with the same detection
probability. Successful policies are considered next.
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no side-effects. As under laissez-faire, this implies that there might be incentives for the
firm to conduct a test. Welfare, however, is always lower than under laissez-faire, because
trade requires a positive test and there are monitoring costs. For completeness we remark
that for the above specified set of parameter values, for example, the policy FWCE = 5000
and ρWCE = 0.09 implements mandatory disclosure with weak confidence effect. For this
policy welfare is WWCE = 439, as q˜HR∅ = 0.42 and hence Kt = 400.
4.3 Perfect enforcement with strong confidence effect
Consider a policy (F, ρ) such that F ≥ F˜1(q, ρ) and the firm has an incentive to report
honestly. Moreover, assume that q
B
≤ q˜HR∅ ; there is a strong confidence effect (SCE).
Both consumers become trustful and buy, unless side-effects are discovered. This implies
that the firm gains nothing from testing. Formally, the cost threshold for investment is the
same for an informative and a non-informative equilibrium. As this threshold is negative,
only the non-informative equilibrium exists. Consumers benefit from the product when it
is of high quality. They experience side-effects when quality is low and monitoring does
not reveal information. Welfare is hence given by
WSCE = 2q (CS + pˆi) + (1− q) (1− ρ) [2 (CS + pˆi)−HA −HB]− ρKρ. (17)
The cheapest such policy sets q
B
= q˜HR∅ . For the above specified set of parameter values
this policy is FSCE = 300 and ρSCE = 0.63. Since q˜
HR
∅ = 0.64, we have K¬t = −22.5 and
there is a unique non-informative equilibrium with welfare WSCE = 451.
4.4 Perfect enforcement with intermediate confidence effect
Consider a policy (F, ρ) such that F ≥ F˜1(q, ρ) and the firm has an incentive to report
honestly. Moreover, assume that q
A
≤ q˜HR∅ < qB; there is an intermediate confidence
effect (ICE). Consumer A buys unless the test proves that there are side-effects, while
consumer B does not buy unless the test proves that there are no side-effects. This
intermediate level of trade in the absence of further information implies that there might
be gains from investment in information. Indeed, we have that
Kt = K¬t = [q − (1− q) (1− ρ)] pˆi, (18)
which will be positive, provided the prior q and the detection probability ρ are high
enough. When the firm’s test is successful both consumers trade. Otherwise only con-
sumer A buys, provided no side-effects are discovered. Hence, welfare follows
WICE = 2xq (CS + pˆi) + (1− x) q (CS + pˆi) (19)
+ (1− q) (1− x) (1− ρ) (CS + pˆi −HA)− ρKρ.
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WICE might be higher than WSCE, because the strong disincentive effect on information
search is avoided, the firm invests in information and reports honestly. In addition, mon-
itoring costs are lower and the strong potential side-effects HB are avoided, as consumer
B is not trustful enough to buy without further information. WICE might be higher than
WLF , because consumer A is trustful enough to buy and the firm reports side-effects
honestly. For the above specified set of parameter values the cheapest such policy is
FICE = 990 and ρICE = 0.34. Since q˜
HR
∅ = 0.5, we have Kt = 0.07 and there is a unique
informative honest reporting equilibrium. Welfare is WICE = 505.
4.5 Imperfect enforcement tolerating some selective reporting
The best policy considered so far induces perfect enforcement (with intermediate con-
fidence effect; Subsection 4.4). But imperfect enforcement in which some information
remains concealed, can also be optimal. To see this, suppose that in addition to the firm
already considered, there is another firm operating in a different market. Both firms are
subject to the same enforcement policy. Hence there are no additional monitoring costs.33
We show that the policy described in Subsection 4.4 remains optimal. With this policy
with intermediate confidence effect, there is an informative selective reporting equilib-
rium in the second market. Stricter enforcement leads to a non-informative equilibrium
generating lower social welfare in that market, so that overall welfare is also lower.
To see that this can be achieved, assume that unless specified otherwise the above
specified set of parameter values apply also to the second market. Suppose in the second
market profits pˆi2 = 560 are slightly higher than in the first market, so that F < F˜1(q, ρ).
Consequently, the second firm has a strict incentive to report selectively. Assume there
is a consumer C with CSC = 2450 and HC = 5000 so that qC is just above the updated
belief for the policy with intermediate confidence effect, that is q˜HR∅ < qC . Consequently,
when consumer C anticipates selective reporting, trade requires proof that there are no
side-effects and an informative selective reporting equilibrium in the second market exists.
In the example, q˜SR∅ = 0.29, qC = 0.51, and hence Kt = 25. The equilibrium is unique
and welfare is WSR2 = 722. Overall welfare in the two markets is 1227.
Other enforcement policies do not yield higher overall welfare. Consider stronger en-
forcement that raises both the fine and the detection probability a little bit, so that it
eradicates selective reporting and induces consumer C to be trustful unless side-effects are
discovered. In the example the cheapest such policy is F = 1000 and ρ = 0.36. A strong
disincentive effect applies, the firm gains nothing from testing and only a non-informative
equilibrium exists. Hence, overall welfare is only 933. The informative selective reporting
equilibrium generates higher welfare, because by generating less trade it avoids side-effects.
33Alternatively, assume that monitoring in each market implies a cost of ρK ′ρ, where 2K
′
ρ = Kρ. This
yields the same total welfare in the two markets as our formulation.
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This ranking does not change if the additional resources for inspections are costless. Con-
sider now the policy FWCE = 5000 and ρWCE = 0.09 implementing mandatory disclosure
with weak confidence effect in the first market. Raising the fine further eventually im-
plements mandatory disclosure in both markets, so that trade requires a positive test.
Overall welfare is only 1161. Thus, the optimal fine might be smaller than the largest
possible fine, even though less resources for inspections are required.34
5 Alternative monitoring technologies
Our analysis postulates a specific monitoring technology inspired by the FDA inspecting
production plants and searching for, say, contamination problems. Two assumptions
seem important. First, monitoring might reveal information both on the firm’s reporting
behaviour and on the state of the world. Second, the agency only searches for information
on the state of the world in which quality problems appear.
The main forces of our model are still present if the agency focusses more on the
discovery of selective reporting than on the state of the world. To see this consider the
extreme assumption that it does not search for information on the state of the world at
all. If the firm reports selectively (y = 0), the outcome of the agency’s report either
discovers this (r = 0) or discovers nothing (r = ∅), with probabilities
Pr (r = 0|v = 0 ∧ y = 0) = ρ = 1− Pr (r = ∅|v = 0 ∧ y = 0) .
If the firm reports honestly or does not invest in information, then the agency learns
nothing from monitoring. Under these assumptions the posterior beliefs of the public are
given by (5), where q˜∅ must be replaced with
q˜′∅ ≡
q(1− x)
1− x[1− (1− q) (1− y) (1− ρ)] .
This expression differs from q˜∅, because monitoring never reveals side-effects when the
firm’s test fails. But, since ∂q˜∅/∂ρ > 0 (for y < 1), the confidence effect of monitoring is
still present. It can be shown that the relationship between the monitoring instruments
can still be complementary and in this sense Proposition 3 is robust. Proposition 4 also
goes through, although when the monitoring technology is powerful, the incentives to
invest do not depend on the detection probability. Moreover, ∂q˜∅/∂y > 0 so that the
scepticism effect of selective reporting is still present. Bounded average quality (Assump-
tion 2.1) is still necessary and sufficient for investment in information when monitoring
34The policy FSCE = 300 and ρSCE = 0.63, which implements mandatory disclosure with strong
confidence effect in the first market, induces again a non-informative equilibrium in both markets. Overall
welfare is only 1208. This policy performs relatively well, because the probability of detection is high and
reveals the existence of side-effects frequently. The more realistic assumption of a convex cost function
for monitoring, rather than our linear formulation, would make this policy less attractive.
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is successful. Therefore, the main forces of our model do not disappear when the agency
focusses more on the discovery of selective reporting than on the state of the world.
A different question is monitoring that provides information on both states of the
world. This weakens the confidence effect. But note that the optimal enforcement policy
in Section 4 induces an intermediate rather than a strong confidence effect. In the extreme,
when the agency is equally effective in discovering both states of the world, the confidence
effect disappears entirely. But, since the firm has no incentive to hide ‘good news’, it is
unclear that monitoring should invest scarce resources in this type of information, rather
than in ‘bad news’. Note also that even without the confidence effect, the scepticism
effect of selective reporting is still present, as ∂q˜∅/∂y > 0. This increases the opportunity
costs of information search and deters investment in information. Consider Example 1.
It is still possible that the introduction of monitoring eradicates selective reporting and
induces the consumer to be trustful unless side-effects are discovered. The firm gains
nothing from testing and only a non-informative equilibrium exists. Depending on the
severity of side-effects this equilibrium might yield lower welfare than the informative
selective reporting equilibrium before the introduction of monitoring. Therefore a similar
logic to the one in the analysis of Section 4 might still apply.
6 Conclusions
The present paper contributed to deepen our understanding of the effects of enforcement
of mandatory disclosure regulations. In our model a firm can invest in information about
product quality and decide whether or not to disclose the findings. If the firm holds back
information, it might be detected and fined. While we showed that such a monitoring
policy can improve over laissez-faire, we also saw that optimal monitoring is determined
by a trade-off between the quality and quantity of information provided. This trade-off
involves important subtleties, including the fact that relationship between the detection
probability and the fine might be complementary. We also showed that the welfare effects
of mandatory disclosure depend on how it is enforced and that imperfect enforcement
might be optimal. Lastly, the optimal fine might be smaller than the largest possible fine,
even though the latter requires lower resource costs for inspections.
Our persuasion game with an endogenously informed sender might also shed some
light on other situations. Consider the interaction between a firm, a rating agency and
investors (see Faure-Grimaud et al., 2009). If the firm asks for a corporate governance
rating and has the ownership of it, it might report the rating selectively. Mandatory
disclosure, however, deters the firm’s incentives to pay the agency for a rating. When
there is no obligation to ask for a rating and ratings are valued by investors, our analysis
implies that a similar trade-off between the quality and quantity of information to the
one in the present paper appears. There might hence be situations in which it is optimal
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to enforce mandatory disclosure rules for ratings imperfectly.
The aim of the present paper was to provide a formal framework to think rigorously
about enforcement. While our results uncover a trade-off that optimal enforcement must
balance, we do not offer an empirical assessment of this trade-off. Future research should
provide further guidelines when strict enforcement is desirable by quantifying the disin-
centive effect and the welfare consequences through empirical work for specific mandatory
disclosure rules, like clinical trials.
There are, however, reasons to believe that the incentives of firms to search for infor-
mation are an important concern. Indeed, drug approval often requires so-called post-
marketing clinical trials and it is documented that firms fail to comply (US Food and Drug
Administration, 2011; Fain et al, 2013). While this suggests that we can interpret our
model as a benchmark situation in which post-marketing trials are either not required or
not enforced, there is another enforcement problem when obliging firms to search for infor-
mation. Thus an interesting avenue for future research considers two-dimensional policies
that monitor both selective reporting and whether investment in information took place
in the first place. It appears that the disincentive effect on information search is reduced,
as a fine might be imposed when the firm is found out not to have searched. But we leave
a rigorous analysis of the overall effects of monitoring and of the optimal two-dimensional
monitoring policy for future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider F˜ as defined in (8). Both instruments are substitutes provided ∂F˜y(q,ρ)
∂ρ
< 0, for





















1−xq−(1−q)[ρ+xy(1−ρ)] , we obtain
∂F˜y(q,ρ)
∂ρ
< 0 if and only if (14) holds. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The result follows from computing the derivatives of (12). Consider first an increase in
the fine. For F ≤ F˜0 (q, ρ) and F ≥ F˜1 (q, ρ), we obtain
∂Kt
∂F
= − (1− q) ρ < 0 and ∂Kt
∂F
= 0,
respectively. Consider now an increase in the detection probability. For F ≤ F˜0 (q, ρ) and









− (1− q)F < 0 and
∂Kt
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1−ρ(1−q) , we obtain that
∂Kt
∂ρ
< 0 if and only if (20) holds. Q.E.D.
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